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pages 25–40.  <weston@elon.edu>. ntroduction 
he familiar “centrisms” in environmental ethics aim to make ethics 
rogressively more inclusive by expanding a single circle of moral 
onsideration. This paper proposes a radically different kind of 
eometry. Multi-centrism envisions a world of irreducibly diverse and 
ultiple centres of being and value—not one single circle, of whatever 
ize or growth rate, but many circles, partially overlapping, each with 
ts own centre. Moral consideration necessarily becomes plural and 
ngoing, and moral action takes place within an open-ended context of 
egotiation and covenant. Much critical and constructive work, both in 
nvironmental ethics proper and in many related fields, is already multi-
entric in spirit and sometimes even by name. This paper aims to draw 
t together into an explicit, alternative environmental-ethical “platform.” 
nstead of “the expanding circle” 
nvironmental ethics is often framed in geometrical terms. We are 
nvited to ask how big the circle of moral consideration can or 
hould get and where to draw the line between what counts and 
hat doesn’t. Historically, according to this view, ethics began by 
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stretching the circle of the self first to include some other humans 
(family, community, etc.) and then, eventually, to a “universal” 
view on which all humans count. The familiar extensionist 
argument insists that we cannot justly draw the line at the boundary 
of the human species either. Why should the species border be any 
more impenetrable, truly any more natural, than the boundaries of 
human clan or nation? Other animals present themselves—first only 
some, then arguably all. The “expanding circle,” as Peter Singer 
famously called it,1 keeps pushing outward: to all living things next, 
including plants and trees for example, which may not be conscious 
subjects but are clearly self-organized and responsive systems; then 
to the land—the community of life. A little farther and we may have 
to consider the rivers, mountains, the air as well, and perhaps even 
the Earth as a whole. 
 
This familiar geometry I will call “con-centric.” Each new circle of 
moral consideration is supposed to enclose the previous circles 
neatly, evenly, and totally, all the way back to the single original 
centre, just like the concentric ripples from a single stone dropped 
into a still pond. 
 
Con-centrism is a natural and indeed generous way of framing 
environmental ethics. Yet it cannot be said to be the only possible 
approach. Even in purely geometrical terms, there is an obvious 
alternative: a multi-centred vision according to which more-than-
human others enter the moral realm on their own terms, rather than 
by expansion from a single centre—a vision according to which 
there are diverse centres, shifting and overlapping but still each with 
its own distinctive starting-point. For a multi-centred ethic, then, the 
growth of moral sensitivity and consideration does not proceed 
through an expanding series of con-centric realms, each neatly 
assimilating or incorporating the previous stage within a larger and 
more inclusive whole. No: instead we discover a world of separate 
though mutually implicated centres. Moral growth consists in 
experiencing more and more deeply the texture of multiplicity in the 
world, not in tracing the wider and wider circles set off from one 
single centre. 
 
Such a multi-centric vision reflects our experience of the difference 
of more-than-human others, without, on the other hand, wholly 
denying commonality either. Real experience is just not so uni-
centric: not out there with the bugs and the lightning, the mountains 
and the stars, and maybe not even with each other. Moreover, even 
the barest sketch of a multi-centred vision quickly reminds us of 
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many themes that have occupied certain rich lines of alternative 
environmental philosophizing for years: of feminist and 
phenomenological critiques of the sameness-versus-difference 
construction of so many ‘others,’ both human and other-than-
human; of the possibility of a relational ethic toward nature 
intimated both by these postmodern kinds of philosophizing as well 
as by certain premodern or indigenous thoughtlines; and of certain 
other suggestive, but as yet unassimilated concepts in the field, such 
as “universal consideration,” environmental “etiquette,” and the first 
sketches of a possible “communicative ethics for the biosphere.”  
 
Many hands are already doing this work. My aim is not to add 
another specific piece to it here. I am concerned instead with its 
overall visibility, particularly as a shared program fundamentally 
alternative to the prevailing Western paradigm. Of necessity it does 
not fit readily into the prevailing model of what a theory in 
environmental ethics must look like. All the same, this work, 
considered together, has a coherent and shared direction of its own. 
This essay proposes that the theme of a multi-centred ethic 
represents a new paradigm or unifying “platform” in environmental 
philosophy, and offers a rough and provisional sketch to that end. 
 
Con-centrism questioned 
 
At the very least, con-centrism cannot be taken for granted as if it 
were the only possible model of a larger-minded ethic. There may 
be more attractive alternatives—most of this paper is devoted to 
advancing one. I begin with a (very) brief and more direct 
challenge. 
 
On the con-centric vision, each previous circle, each previous set of 
moral considerations and each previous moral stage, is wholly 
nested within the next. We are invited to see the claims of the self in 
the context of, and as an instance of, the claims of humans as such. 
We are invited to see the claims of humans in the context of, and as 
an instance of, the claims of animals as such; and so on. This has 
long been a source both of deep-rooted objections to the whole 
picture—distinctiveness is lost, say the critics, “there is nothing 
special about X (me, humans, animals, etc.) anymore” —but also, 
for the same reason, is a point of pride for many environmental 
philosophers. This is supposed to be our latter-day universalism, the 
cutting edge of ethics. Everything is to be valued under the aspect of 
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wider and wider categories: sentience, or life, or creative dynamism, 
or sheer being.2
 
The suggestion is that what we have in common, even with tigers 
and trees and probably even with rocks and bacteria, is more 
important than that which divides us. And there are surely 
commonalities to be found, “identifications” that, apart from this 
procedure, we would no doubt overlook. The implicit monism, 
though—arranging our argument so that the commonalities alone 
ground the ethic—is more troublesome.  
 
For one thing—the simplest point—an approach based purely on 
commonality necessarily slights difference. Specific modes of life 
or styles of consciousness, or ultimately even the fact of life or 
consciousness itself, may no longer count at all. As the circle 
becomes wider and wider, commonalities become thinner and 
thinner.3 The search for a single, inclusive criterion of moral 
standing ultimately washes out nearly everything. 
 
It is arguable, though, that despite its veneer of egalitarianism, the 
usual con-centric argument is profoundly human-centred 
underneath. Since “the expanding circle” expands by finding 
commonalities with what lies within the already-accepted circle, the 
self and its essential character—and, a little farther out, the human 
and its essential character—still sit as ultimate arbiter. The suffering 
of others, human or nonhuman, for example, comes to count in the 
utilitarian argument because I can connect it to my own, because I 
recognize that suffering is bad for me and therefore, unable to draw 
any morally relevant distinction between me and a wider range of 
others, I must conclude that it is equally bad for them. All 
commonality refers back to the already-given centre, and in fact it is 
guaranteed that whatever commonality drives any given “expanded” 
ethics, I have got to have it—indeed par excellence. 
 
In short, a kind of ego-centric and species-centric model, so familiar 
from the ethical tradition generally, has not been deeply challenged 
but in fact is almost unconsciously imported into the ethics of “the 
expanding circle.” As Val Plumwood puts it in a memorable line, 
Singerian moral extensionism “does not really dispel speciesism; it 
only extends and disguises it.”4 A workably radical environmental 
ethic may have farther to go than we thought—and perhaps in less 
familiar and less comfortable directions as well. 
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Multi-centrism 
 
Many alternative lines of thinking, I believe, now converge on a 
view that calls all the existing con-centrisms into question—an 
alternative, systematic, multi-centric project. Something bigger and 
more dramatic is afoot than a mere set of offbeat complaints. The 
parts connect, augment each other, synergize. We can sketch this 
emerging multi-centric vision in four main points. 
 
Decentring the human 
 
We begin by insisting that neither one’s own self nor the 
human/species self is the only model of being or presence or the 
only possible touchstone for moral consideration. Others have their 
own stories, not to be “measured by man.” Only understanding our 
place in this way, indeed, is it possible for us to honour our 
distinctiveness as essential to our particular mode of being and (in 
part) to what we take to be our consequent moral standing, and yet 
not impose ourselves as models for everyone and everything else’s 
being and moral standing.  
 
Philosophers may hear this as nothing more than the typical 
rejection of anthropocentrism. The typical assumption, however, is 
that anthropocentrism must be replaced with some other, bigger 
centrism.  Multi-centrists strive for decentring instead: we reject any 
uni-centrism. The conceptual apparatus for this de-centring emerges 
from a number of related critical fields: in feminist and post-
colonial work, for instance, where the aim is to decentre the “male 
subject” (andro-centrism) or the colonizers’ identities (Euro-
centrism), respectively. A recent anthology linking both of these 
areas is even titled Decentering the Center.5 Ecofeminists draw out 
the parallels between the construction of oppressive self-other 
dichotomies in human spheres such as these and similarly 
oppressive dichotomies beyond the human sphere (“(hu)man versus 
‘animal’,” for instance, and “(hu)man versus nature”).6
 
In all of these cases, the danger is what Plumwood labels 
“hegemonic” centrism: establishing one’s own (or one’s groups’) 
centrality by systematically reconstructing all otherness either as 
some version of the One Centre’s dynamic, or by marginalizing and 
radically devaluing it in relation to that Centre, or both, reducing it 
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to orbit and periphery.7 Indeed the hegemonic type of centrism is so 
pervasive, and perhaps seems so natural, that we may become 
uneasy with characterizing a (hopefully) non-hegemonic alternative 
as any form of centrism whatsoever—although words like 
“polycentric” and “multipolar” are in the air too. Still, there is at 
least no question that decentring is the necessary starting point. We 
must resist the dynamic of assimilation and marginalization that 
ecofeminists identify so clearly, and thus recognize a world of 
multiple voices and beings that do not reduce to a single type and do 
not naturally fall into the orbit of one single sort of being’s centre.  
  
A diversity of centres: or, the multiverse 
 
Drop a single stone in a pond and you create a concentric set of 
ripples. Toss in a whole handful of pebbles, and ripples set off from 
many points at once, each its own “centre,” each soon intersecting 
and intermingling with others without losing its distinctness, its own 
place of origin and its own way of “making waves.” This, multi-
centrism insists, is what the world is actually like. A de-centred 
world is not (need not be) an a-centred world. Instead we envision a 
many-centred world, a diversity of centres, a world of thick and 
polynodal texture. Each of a thousand human and more-than-human 
presences organizes a certain part of the world around itself, forms a 
distinctive local pattern, a certain organic completeness and 
cohesion. David Abram proposes Van Gogh’s painting “Starry 
Night” as an illustration: each star is its own vortex or spiral of 
energy, not somehow drawing all the rest into its orbit, but surely 
and visibly a presence in its own right.8
 
The very first example of an “I and Thou” relation that Martin 
Buber offers in his book of the same title involves a tree. We can 
experience a tree as a “picture,” Buber says, or as an invitation to 
botanizing or chemistry or in many other ways. We can also “be 
drawn into a relation” with “the tree itself,” he says, as it stands “in 
conversation with the elements and with the stars” as well as with 
ourselves.9 Here we enter a world of difference that is nonetheless 
not alien—of separate identities that somewhat intermingle. Always 
there are other stories being unfolded, right here around us; always 
other “force-fields” (Neil Evernden’s term10) within which we 
move. 
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Intentional consciousness is one kind of “centring,” then, but not the 
only one.11 Around us are not merely a multitude of humans or of 
conscious centres, and not merely a multitude of other midsized and 
discrete “force-fields” like rocks and trees, but a multitude of other 
kinds of “force-fields”—rhizomes, tectonic plates, bacteria, 
nebulae—at many different levels of organization too, from species 
and ecosystems to individual cells. Indeed, in place of the notion of 
“universe” itself, it is high time to speak instead, following William 
James, of the “multiverse.”12 To speak of multi-centredness, then, is 
to invoke a world thick with many sorts of presence, in which we 
move amidst and within other or larger force-fields or centres of 
gravity.13 It may even be that this is the root intuition for which 
environmental ethics from the start has tried to speak—only in a 
uni-centric language unsuited to a world brimming not just with life 
but with shifting and self-organizing energies of many different 
kinds. 
 
The multiverse calls forth etiquette 
 
In a diverse world of unsuspected depths, we are called to a kind of 
attentiveness much wider and much less pre-structured than the 
existing uni-centrisms suggest. 
 
Tom Birch lays out certain essential arguments for what he calls 
“universal consideration.” Nothing, says Birch, is to be pushed 
aside without a thought—not, however, because we have or can find 
some universal criterion of moral standing, but because the very 
process of paying attention, even to devise or apply such a criterion, 
already has to be universal, already has to take in everything. What 
is required, in short, is moral consideration in what Birch calls “the 
root sense”: the process of actually, carefully, considering all things. 
All things. It is a process, open-ended toward the other creatures, 
toward whatever lies on the other end. In fact, universal 
consideration requires us to reverse the usual burden of proof as we 
approach others in the world. “Others are now taken as valuable, 
even though we may not yet know how or why, until they are 
proved otherwise.”14
 
The practice of universal consideration, moreover, requires a new 
kind of comportment. An open-ended world of multiple, diverse, 
and always somewhat opaque centres requires us to move with 
caution, attentiveness, circumspection. Ethics is no longer 
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constituted by a merely abstract respect, but demands something far 
more embodied: a willingness and ability to make the space, not just 
conceptually, but in one’s own person and in the design and 
structure of personal and human spaces, for the emergence of more-
than-human others into relationship. Here, multi-centrism embraces 
a leading theme in the larger environmental literature that so far has 
only barely percolated into philosophical ethics: what Gary Snyder, 
echoed by many others, calls “etiquettes of freedom and of grace.”15
 
Moreover, this is not a merely one-way practice. Many 
postmodernisms converge with the claim that the world we think we 
know is profoundly shaped by our approach to it, by our established 
ethics and ways of knowing. The attitudes and comportment with 
which we approach other centres partly determine the ways in 
which they respond or show up. Thus, as Jim Cheney and I have 
argued, we can no longer think of ourselves as merely responding to 
a world considered to be given and fixed.16 If our very mode of 
approach shapes that world in turn, then ethics itself must be a form 
of invitation or welcoming, sometimes of ritual invocation and 
embodiment and sometimes of literally creating the settings in 
which new possibilities might emerge. On the usual view of other 
animals, for instance, we must first know what animals are capable 
of and then decide on that basis whether and how we are to consider 
them ethically. On a more open-ended view, we will have only 
inadequate ideas of what other animals are actually capable until we 
already have approached them ethically: that is, until we have 
offered them the space and time and occasion to enter into 
relationship. Ethics both implies and is implied by etiquette, in this 
sense, itself. 
 
Ethics as a co-constituted process 
 
Uni-centrism extends and disguises a kind of uni-lateralism in ethics 
as well. If there is but one circle of moral consideration with 
ourselves at the centre, it is natural to suppose that we can and 
perhaps must make moral decisions by our own lights. One kind of 
consideration remains, though perhaps operating over a wider 
sphere. One kind of actor—ourselves—remains essential and 
central, even if our deliberations must take account of more-than-
human others as well. 
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Multi-centrism undercuts the very possibility of this sort of 
unilateralism. We cannot practice ethics on our own. Once other 
centres are acknowledged, always somewhat opaque to us as we are 
to them, there is no alternative but to work things out together, as 
far as is possible, when all are affected by the decisions taken. The 
key to ethical life in the multiverse becomes what Paul Shepard 
calls “the elaboration of covenants and negotiations with the 
Other.”17  
 
Such an alternative vision of ethics is evolving as a wide range of 
thinkers challenge the traditional conception of ethics as a principle-
based decision-making method for resolving ethical quandaries. 
Many feminists argue for a concept of ethics as, in Margaret 
Walker’s lovely words, “a collection of perceptive, imaginative, 
appreciative, and expressive skills and capacities which put us and 
keep us in contact with the realities of ourselves and specific 
others.”18 A persistent strand of writing both in and out of this 
journal is patiently exploring the theme of dialogue beyond—
sometimes way beyond—the human sphere.19 Carolyn Merchant 
elaborates a “partnership ethics” in which “both humans and nature 
are active agents.”20 In the work of musicians, such as Jim Nollman, 
we catch glimpses of unimagined possibilities of cross-species 
connection.21 From another angle, ethicists in the Habermasian line 
have worked out a model that locates key ethical features—
impartiality, mutual recognition, freedom from deception and self-
deception—not in specific principles or outcomes but rather in the 
procedures by which such decisions are made, and recent writers, 
such as John Dryzek and, again, Val Plumwood, are bringing that 
tradition into environmental thinking to sketch what Dryzek calls a 
“communicative ethics for the biosphere.”22
 
I shall say more on this below. The point for now is just that, 
however difficult or unfamiliar, this is multi-centrism’s mandate, 
and in fact a great deal of ongoing work is already in this key. 
Ethics is an ongoing, co-constituted process, indeed co-constituted 
far beyond the human sphere, and recognizing, sustaining, and 
enriching that process is itself ethics’ deepest requirement.  
 
Questions and contrasts 
 
Val Plumwood challenges the use of any kind of “centrism” label 
for a positive alternative. In several detailed works, Plumwood lays 
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out a systematic theory of centrism as such, including egocentrism, 
androcentrism, and Eurocentrism, as well as anthropocentrism and 
the transhuman centrisms. In each case, one centre claims priority 
and superiority, devaluing and consequently opening the way for 
exploitation of all other poles, reducing them to feeble, inferior, and 
deficient reflections of itself.23 This, again, she calls “hegemonic” 
centrism. And here is the rub: any centrism, in Plumwood’s view, is 
at least implicitly hegemonic. At the very least, using the term in the 
way I propose may confuse and dilute the critique of hegemonic 
centrism. Moreover, the multiplication of centres by itself does not 
guarantee that the multiple centres will not themselves be 
hegemonic, as colonialism’s record suggests.24
 
Plumwood’s preferred responses are “counter-hegemonic” or 
“counter-centric” strategies: foregrounding interdependence rather 
than independence, for instance; emphasizing within-group 
differences and cross-group commonalities rather than vice versa; 
affirming rather than devaluing the distinctive characteristics of 
non-human Others.25 The aim, she says, is to “attain solidarity with 
others in their difference,” rather than either incorporating and 
ultimately subsuming difference or making difference radical and 
absolute.26 Solidarity’s demands are through and through practical 
and political, adapted to the demands of particular struggles and our 
own culture’s peculiar burdens and pitfalls. 
 
It is certainly true that we do not want to find ourselves rejecting the 
familiar hegemonic centrisms only to erect a new one of exactly the 
same type. Despite the stereotypes, few feminists want to simply 
replace patriarchy with matriarchy. Few Afro-centrists want to 
devalue everything European in favour of a new African hegemony. 
On the other hand, many (not all) philosophers and activists 
working in these areas continue to speak of their projects as 
“centric.” Indeed, the project of creating a new kind of centrism 
seems to them essential, as it does to me. What they offer is not 
really a rejection of centrism as such, but rather a new 
understanding of centredness, a new understanding of power, 
opening the possibility of a genuine kind of centrism free from the 
hegemony, so to say, of hegemonic centrism itself. In this sense we 
call a person “centred” when they have a focus, an equilibrium, 
some balanced sense of self to fall back upon: it does not preclude 
other similar or not so similar “centres.” Plumwood herself speaks 
eloquently of defending nonhuman earth others as “independent 
centres with potential needs, excellences, and claims to flourish of 
their own.”27 Leading African philosophers and activists write of 
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Afrocentrism as making Africa “subject, not object”—not, however, 
to exclude other “subjects”—and of “placing Africans at the centre 
of knowledge about themselves.”28
 
The critical words here are “empowerment,” “self-definition,” 
“inclusion”—and, once again, “centre.” These thinkers are not 
looking for an “a-centred” world but rather a polycentric world, 
centred many times over, only without a dominant centre. I believe 
that Plumwood is right that any centre, defined too readily by 
simplistic self-conceptions and the exclusion of others, slides 
toward a kind of self-aggrandizement. Contemporary international 
politics offers all the examples one needs. On the other hand, on a 
genuine pluralistic vision, what is excluded is not devalued but is 
instead revalued in terms of its own dynamic self-centring, and the 
exclusions are never total. Separate centres may be both sharply 
different in some ways and similar in others. There is both overlap 
and heterogeneity. Plumwood is surely right that these points must 
be continually insisted upon—but that is true regardless of what 
terms we adopt.29
 
Consider several other brief contrasts.  
 
Multi-centrism obviously can be called pluralistic, but it has only an 
oblique connection with the “pluralism debate” that has unfolded 
over the past decade or so in environmental ethics. The advocates of 
this sort of pluralism have typically defended the usefulness of 
multiple ethical theories rather than just one. J. Douglas Rabb 
speaks of “polycentrism,” for instance, but his multiple “centres” 
turn out to be different types of ethical theories.30 Correspondingly 
pluralism’s critics have mostly contested just this point.31
 
Multi-centrism, by contrast, implies a much more radical and 
polymorphous pluralism. Multiplicity and variety, as on James’ 
view, are fundamental to the world itself: to things themselves, in 
short, not just to values. A multi-centred ethic need have no 
investment in “theories” whatsoever, as opposed to diverse 
articulations or manifestations of values that do not claim 
universality, and it need not propose that the reconciliation of 
apparently competing values is somehow a theoretical activity at all, 
but rather a form of integrative practice and on-the-ground (there’s 
“grounding” for you!) negotiation.32 It calls upon a rather different 
set of philosophical, and more-than-philosophical, skills. 
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Multi-centrism might seem to imply a form of environmental 
“holism” or “biospheric egalitarianism.” Contra holism, though, 
multi-centrism does not assert a single ecological “whole” that is 
somehow the natural and prior ethical centre. This verges on 
hegemonizing once again. The multiverse consists of individuals, of 
various sorts and “levels,” in flux and flow: it is more particular, 
varied, knobby. “Biospheric egalitarianism” is a little closer, maybe, 
but it is too formal, abstract, unworkable, and above all unilateral: it 
seems to suggest that once rights or values are appropriately 
(“equally”) distributed, human decision-makers can figure out what 
to do without any need to consult or negotiate. Multi-centrism, once 
again, proposes a different kind of decision-procedure: a procedural 
model based on open-ended dialogue and negotiation. 
 
Multi-centrism also suggests a rather unexpected critical angle on 
familiar mega-centrisms such as Bio-centrism or Eco-centrism. It 
begins to seem that these views are emboldened to call themselves 
“centrisms” in the first place only because they are—implicitly—
wholly oppositionally defined. The aim is to “centre” on something 
bigger than humanity. Both of these views, though, to put it crudely, 
are too big for “centres” in the sense being advanced here. They are 
not nodes of a matrix but the matrix itself. It is certainly not clear 
how we can “centre” on the Earth as such: this is more like a-
centrism than any actual centrism whatsoever.33 I suspect, then, that 
such mega-centrisms really represent only a form of resistance or 
refusal of the usual anthropocentrism. To “go beyond” 
anthropocentrism, on a multi-centric approach, what we must really 
challenge is not the “anthropo-” part but the implicit (con)centrism. 
 
Multi-centrism in practice 
 
Multi-centrism asks us to “take care” with respect to everything, 
and the sort of mindfulness thus implied can only be called 
polymorphous too. That animals must suffer if we eat meat is 
certainly a point in favour of vegetarianism, for instance, but then 
again, the whole universe “suffers,” as a Buddhist might put it—
there are wide-ranging effects both subtle and not so subtle—no 
matter what we eat. We must simply be self-conscious and 
extraordinarily careful about whatever we eat. We must “take care” 
to walk as lightly as we can—which may have quite different and 
even unexpected implications in different places and times—and in 
the spiritual sense of thankfulness and awareness of communion: 
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care for example not to waste food, to share it generously and 
prepare it with an eye to retaining its particular gifts. A further step 
would be to begin to recover First Nations/Native American 
practices of negotiating food with the beings we consume (and, 
logically, with those who might consume us).34  
 
These are not the kinds of implications one probably expects for 
what is after all, in part, a practical ethic. That such an ethic must 
essentially offer a principle-based decision-making method, 
however, is not the only possible practicality one might ask of it. 
We might do better to see certain quintessentially ethical features 
precisely in multi-centrism’s “universal carefulness”—a kind of 
honour, for example, and an overriding commitment to 
attentiveness. Its practicality is only of a different kind—fully 
engaging a complex practical question, for instance, rather than 
insisting on a more or less final, arguable, conclusive answer.  
  
To conceive ethics along the lines of etiquette—opening of the 
“space” for interaction, for the re-emergence of a larger world—
also calls for a kind of particular, embodied exploration. 
Anthropologist Henry Sharp writes that for the Chipewyan Indians, 
“all animate life interacts and, to a greater or lesser degree, affects 
the life and behaviour of all other animate forms,” and draws a 
telling contrast. 
The Chipewyan interact with all life in accordance with their understanding, and 
the animate universe responds. White Canada does not come silently and openly 
into the bush in search of understanding or communion, it sojourns briefly in the 
full glory of its colonial power to exploit and regulate all animate being . . . It 
comes asserting a clashing causal certainty in the fundamentalist exercise of the 
power of its belief. It talks too loudly, its posture is wrong, its movement harsh 
and graceless; it does not know what to see and it hears nothing. Its presence 
brings a stunning confusion heard deafeningly in a growing circle of silence 
created by a confused and disordered animate universe.35
Graceless movement, a jarring presence, even just talking too loud: 
this innocent clumsiness reflects a failure to carry in our very bodies 
an understanding of ourselves as living in a larger animate universe, 
and failure too, crucially, to draw out, to co-participate with, that 
universe. “Environmental etiquette,” then, is no small matter. It has 
none of the trivial connotations of mere manners. It calls for a 
visibly enacted openness to the world. It also goes far beyond 
individual comportment. We need to design neighbourhoods 
specifically for darkness and quiet, building a world that invites 
animal dwelling and migration. We might time new holidays to 
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animal migrations or the Aurora Borealis, turn out all the lights on 
the solstices and equinoxes and nights of meteor showers or for the 
next comets, teach gardening and bird identification in schools, go 
on walkabouts for class trips.36
 
Multicentrism’s most striking implication is its move toward a 
“communicative ethics” that ranges far beyond the human sphere. 
The root intuition is profoundly simple, though enormously difficult 
for us late moderns: it is to recognize the larger world itself as a 
communicative realm. All animate life interacts, as Sharp puts it. 
David Abram writes: 
For the largest part of our species existence, humans have negotiated relationships 
with every aspect of the sensuous surroundings . . . All could speak, articulating in 
gesture and whistle and sigh a shifting web of meanings that we felt on our skin or 
inhaled through our nostrils or focused with our listening ears, and to which we 
replied—whether with sounds, or through movements, or minute shifts of mood . . 
. Every sound was a voice, every scrape or blunder was a meeting—with Thunder, 
with Oak, with Dragonfly . . .37
“We are never alone,” native peoples say—not even in seemingly 
most wild, most transhuman of places. As Abram makes clear, this 
is at once a basic experience and the upshot of the latest science. 
The last decades have seen a proliferation of research and narrative 
writing on animal cognition and the subtle flows of communication 
involving everything from cetaceans to insects to the Earth itself.38
 
So we live and move, always, among other “centres.” A certain 
etiquette is implied—again in part as a means simply of knowing 
such a world, of actually getting in touch—but also more. Solipsism 
in co-inhabited spaces is not merely a factual error but a moral 
failure.39 To act responsibly in such settings requires a sense of 
reciprocity and mutual accommodation. I would like to say: 
acknowledge that “we are never alone,” and no other way of acting 
is even imaginable.  
 
In many specific ways, often below the cultural radar, a kind of 
more-than-human mutuality is in play already. Sometimes it is even 
in plain-as-day words. 
In the 1950s, Western anthropologists visiting the [Kalahari Desert] noted the eyes 
of many lions glowing just beyond the [Bushmen’s] cooking fire; the animals 
would cease their roaring when a hunter sauntered off to the edge of camp and 
asked them to keep the noise down so the children could sleep. Human and lion 
shared a watering hole, one using it by day and the other by night . . .40
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Parks throughout the United States and Canada routinely instruct 
back-country visitors how to negotiate encounters with bears (Speak 
firmly but not threateningly; Back away but don’t turn or run; Don’t 
stare . . .41). Abram writes of the little rice offerings by means of 
which ants (yes, ants) and people in Bali negotiate the borders of 
their respective living spaces.42 On the level of policy, Arne Naess, 
Bob Jickling, Val Plumwood, and others highlight ways in which 
wild, other-than-human populations can and do systematically 
negotiate boundaries and other practices with adjacent human 
communities.43 Entire new schools of architecture and city design 
are based on what Ian McHarg famously called “design with 
nature”—very much with the emphasis on the word “with.”44
 
When we begin to make a systematic practice of “negotiation” in 
this sense, further and entirely unexpected possibilities will open 
up.45 Think of negotiation in much longer time-frames, too—even 
stretching over centuries, perhaps—and we can imagine a kind of 
“dialogue” in which we even put questions to nature, in the form 
perhaps of a variety of small and slow experiments, carefully 
attended to, in which alternative forms of suburban development or 
farming or even genetic engineering are tried out. Nature responds 
to such things: the land languishes or flourishes, we and the ants or 
the lions live together in peace—or not. And there are other forms 
of direct presence as well. Rivers and mountains aren’t going to 
enter Congress themselves, for example, but why not expect 
Congress to meet on their terms—for example, in the Grand Canyon 
or in the Great Smoky Mountains? Would the votes on Alaskan oil 
drilling look the same if they were actually held in the Arctic 
National Wildlife Refuge? 
 
Christopher Stone points out that the law has long admitted 
nonhuman participants—ships, bridges, and the like as well as 
colleges, municipalities, and corporations—who take part in 
litigation and negotiation through their representatives.46 The same 
is true for individual humans who are unable to participate in their 
own voices; it is now becoming true for future human generations 
as well. At the very least, then, other “centres” should be able to 
take part in decisions that affect them through spokespeople and 
representatives. Gary Snyder famously imagined having Senators 
for the forests and mountains, reinvoking and enriching an already-
ancient practice of the commons.47 “Who speaks for wolf?” is a 
question that Native Americans asked and were able to answer, 
evolving practices and institutions in order to stay in effective 
negotiation with the larger spirits of the land.48 Imagine, as well, a 
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kind of priesthood of cross-species emissaries, an extension of John 
Seed and Joanna Macy’s ritual of the Council of All Beings, 
perhaps, or of the “ecosteries”—ecological monasteries—under 
development by Alan Drengson and others, where people can 
devote their lives to achieving an attunement with nature that would 
allow them to take part in human councils as genuine 
representatives of the more-than-human.49
 
Ethics so imagined will not always produce the quickest and most 
efficient decisions. This is true of any ethic that values process: the 
very constitution of relationship in process is part of the point. We 
might even learn to mistrust the quick and efficient: perhaps part of 
the practical function of ethics sometimes is to slow things down. 
Still, there may also be times when certain questions and challenges 
cannot wait. For such times we may need a provisional, temporary, 
even “emergency” multi-centric ethic: go light, preserve what’s left, 
rebuild where we can, minimize big risks. Much of this, as 
Plumwood notes, is what good ecological activism is already geared 
to accomplish. It is a (conceptually) minimal, basic kind of 
environmental ethic that backgrounds anything deeper. What multi-
centrism adds is the wider and wilder vision: a sustainable, 
participatory, multi-vocal ethics for the Multiverse. The more-than-
human world not merely protected, but—rejoined.  
 
Endnotes 
                                                 
1 Peter Singer, 1981, The Expanding Circle, Farrar, Straus, and Giroux. 
2 Singer’s Animal Liberation (Random House, 1990) and Tom Regan’s The Case for 
Animal Rights (University of California, 1983) make the case for animals; Paul 
Taylor’s Respect for Life (Princeton, 1986) and Albert Schweitzer, Out of My Life and 
Thought (Johns Hopkins, 1998) make the case for the considerability of all life; Aldo 
Leopold’s Sand County Almanac (Oxford, 1949) is often read as a form of “eco-
centrism.” Thomas Berry and Brian Swimme, in The Universe Story (Harper, 1994), 
celebrate the being of absolutely everything. 
3 This way of putting it I owe to a reviewer for Environmental Ethics. In regard to 
human affairs the concern that universality has its costs, especially to the culturally 
particular, has been voiced by critics from Marx in “On the Jewish Question” to 
contemporary communitarians. 
4 Val Plumwood, 2002, Environmental Culture: The Ecological Crisis of Reason, 
Routledge,  p. 148. 
5 Edited by Uma Narayan and Sandra Harding (Indiana University Press, 2000). These 
themes are developed by a wide range of thinkers: for other representative anthologies 
see Nancy Duncan, ed., Bodyspace:  Destabilizing Geographies of Gender and 
The Trumpeter 84 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
Sexuality (Routledge, 1996) and Chandra Talpade Mohanty, Ann Russo, and Lourdes 
Torres, eds., Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism (Indiana University, 
1993). 
6 See Plumwood’s Feminism and the Mastery of Nature (Routledge, 1993) and 
Environmental Culture as well, again, as a wide range of other writers such as Susan 
Griffin’s classic Women and Nature (Harper and Row, 1978) and Carol Adams’ The 
Sexual Politics of Meat (Continuum, 1990). 
7 Environmental Culture, Chapter 5. I return to this theme in section IV below. 
8 In discussion, Spring 2002. Abram also suggested the lovely term “polynodal.” 
9 I and Thou (W. Kaufmann trans., NY: Scribner’s, 1970), pp. 57–59. 
10 In The Natural Alien (University of Toronto, 1985), pp. 40–1 and 98–9. 
11 “Does the tree then have consciousness, similar to our own? I have no experience of 
that. . . . What I encounter is neither the soul of a tree nor a dryad, but the tree itself.” 
(I and Thou, pp. 58–59). 
12 Or “pluriverse,” as James also said. “Things are ‘with’ one another in many ways, 
but nothing includes everything or dominates over everything . . . The pluralistic 
world is . . . more like a federal republic than like an empire or a kingdom. However 
much may be collected, however much may report itself as present at any effective 
centre of consciousness or action, something else is self-governed and absent and 
unreduced to unity . . .” Essays in Radical Empiricism and A Pluralistic Universe 
(Dutton, 1971), pp. 274–5. 
13 They move within us too, for the self is a kind of multicentric “federal republic” as 
well. Multicentrism goes all the way down. I am indebted to Bob Jickling for this 
point. 
14 Tom Birch, “Moral Considerability and Universal Consideration,” Environmental 
Ethics 15 (1993): 313–332. 
15 Gary Snyder, The Practice of the Wild (North Point, 1990), pp. 3–24. Grizzly 
tracker Doug Peacock insists upon “interspecific tact,” Wendell Berry speaks of an 
“etiquette” toward nature, Calvin Martin of “courtesy” between very different beings. 
I develop this theme in Chapter 7 (“Transhuman Etiquettes”) in my  Back to Earth 
(Temple University Press, 1994). 
16 Jim Cheney and Anthony Weston, “Environmental Ethics as Environmental 
Etiquette: Toward an Ethics-Based Epistemology in Environmental Philosophy,” 
Environmental Ethics 21 (1999): 115–34. 
17 Nature and Madness (Sierra Club Books, 1982), p. 38. 
18 Margaret Walker, “Moral Understandings: Alternative ‘Epistemology’ for a 
Feminist Ethics,” Hypatia 4 (1989), p. 21. See also her book of the same title 
(Routledge, 1998). A classic source for revisioning ethics in this key is Eva Kittay and 
Diana Meyers, eds., Women and Moral Theory (Rowman and Littlefield, 1987). 
19 See Scott Friskics, “Dialogical Relations with Nature,” Environmental Ethics 23 
(2001): 391–410; Christopher Manes, “Nature and Silence,” Environmental Ethics 14 
(1992): 339–350; and Christopher Preston, “Conversing with Nature in a Postmodern 
Epistemological Framework,” Environmental Ethics 22 (2000): 227–240. 
20 In Reinventing Eden (Routledge, 2003), Chapter 11: the citation is from p. 228. 
Volume 22, Number 1 85
                                                                                                                     
21 Jim Nollman’s Dolphin Dreamtime (Bantam, 1987) is subtitled “The Art and 
Science of Interspecies Communication.” Rich and wide-angled treatments are David 
Abram, The Spell of the Sensuous (Pantheon, 1996) and Derrick Jensen, A Language 
Older Than Words (Context Books, 2000). 
22 Dryzek, “Green Reason: Communicative Ethics for the Biosphere`,” Environmental 
Ethics 12 (1990): 195–210, and his book The Politics of the Earth (Oxford, 1997); Val 
Plumwood, Environmental Culture, Chapters 5 and 8. 
23 The “Otherised” group, as she calls it, is first of all marked out as radically separate 
(women from men; colonized from colonizer; animals from humans). Differences 
within the Otherised group are then denied and submerged (all women are radically 
distinguished from all men; all animals from all humans . . .). Mutual dependence is 
denied and the Other is construed as inessential or defective, and made invisible. 
Finally, the Other is viewed as valuable only as means to the One’s ends (nature for 
human ends, etc.). Environmental Culture, Chapter 5; see also her essay “Paths 
Beyond Human-Centeredness: Lessons from Liberation Struggles,” in my collection 
An Invitation to Environmental Philosophy (Oxford University Press, 1999). 
24 Plumwood has urged this concern upon me as part of an extensive and energetic 
correspondence since I began this project in the summer of 2002. I am grateful for her 
persistence and insight, which have immeasurably improved my thinking on this and 
many other points. I regret that it is not quite improved enough for her on this one. 
25 See Environmental Culture, Chapter 8, and a brief summary in “Paths Beyond 
Human-Centeredness,” pp. 91–94. 
26 “The choice these two frameworks offer us, of valuing nature either as Same or as 
Different, is ultimately an anthropocentric one, since to base value exclusively on 
either sameness or difference from the human implicitly construes the human as the 
centre and pivot of value.” Environmental Culture, p. 201. 
27 Environmental Culture, p. 167. 
28 Molefi Asante, The Afrocentric Idea (Temple University Press, 1987), p. 3, and C. 
Tsehloane Keto, Vision and Time: Historical Perspective of an Africa-Centered 
Paradigm (University Press of America, 2001), “Vulindlela” (Preface). The term 
“polycentric” is adopted by Samir Amin, in Delinking (Zed Books, 1990), which he 
defines as “subjecting the mutual relations between the various nations and regions of 
the planet to the varying imperatives of their own internal development and not the 
reverse” (p. xii). Keto explicitly speaks of a “multicentred scholarship” and of a “non-
hegemonic African-centred analysis”—as well as a non-hegemonic Europe-centred 
analysis (Vision and Time, pp. xii and 25). Though he carefully distinguishes an 
“Africa-centred paradigm” from “Afro-centrism,” this, he says, is a reaction to certain 
unscholarly excesses by some writers who use the latter label, not a conceptual 
difficulty with “centrism” itself (p. xvii). 
29 Still, in the end, why “centrism”? Why not some other descriptive and less risky 
label? Apart from the difficulty of actually coming up with such a label (OK, you try 
it), the fact remains that the debate between “centrisms” still claims the spotlight in 
the teaching anthologies and in journals such as Environmental Ethics and The 
Trumpeter. The rest of us, then—the many and varied alternative voices I have tried to 
draw into this essay—must enter the lists in a way that is as obviously and 
constructively as possible engaged with the dominant range of views. In my view this 
requires advancing a view under the heading of “centrism” itself. No list of centrisms, 
The Trumpeter 86 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
I would hope, can now be considered complete without multi-centrism—but at the 
same time the very concept is a kind of Trojan horse, for multi-centrism offers an 
alternative to the entire centric project as so far understood. In time it may be better to 
go back to James and label the new view something more like “multiversalism”—or 
embrace Irene Klaver’s lovely pun and call ourselves “ex-centric.” But only in time. 
30 J. Douglas Rabb, “From Triangles to Tripods: Polycentrism in Environmental 
Ethics,” Environmental Ethics 14 (1992): 177-83, and Peter Wenz, “Minimal, 
Moderate, and Extreme Moral Pluralism,” Environmental Ethics 15 (1993): 61-74. 
31 J. B. Callicott, “The Case Against Moral Pluralism,” Environmental Ethics 12 
(1990), esp. p. 104. 
32 Ibid. 
33 David Abram made this point in discussion, Spring 2002. 
34 On this theme, see Plumwood’s Environmental Culture, pp. 225-7. Once again she 
is way out in front. 
35 Henry S. Sharp, The Transformation of Bigfoot: Maleness, Power, and Belief 
among the Chipewyan (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1988), p. 
144–45. 
36 Along with our joint paper cited above (n. 16), commentaries by Jim Cheney and 
myself on Birch’s concept of universal consideration expand this theme (“Universal 
Consideration: A Epistemological Map of the Terrain” (Cheney) and “Universal 
Consideration as an Originary Practice” (Weston) both appear in Environmental 
Ethics 20 (1998)). The celebratory note is especially important to me: just think of the 
attractiveness of what we could call “celebratory environmentalism” as opposed to 
(just an) “environmentalism of threats.” There are implications for teaching as well: 
see my essay “What if Teaching Went Wild?,” in Scott Fletcher, editor, Philosophy of 
Education 2002 (Urbana, Illinois: Philosophy of Education Society, 2003): 40–52.  
37 David Abram, The Spell of the Sensuous, p. ix. 
38 For three chapters of summary that are still far too brief, see my Back to Earth, 
Chapters 2–4. 
39 That is, solipsism (either indvidual or as a species) in co-inhabited spaces (not just 
by other humans but by other “centres” of all sorts) is not merely a factual error (it 
gets the world itself wrong) but a moral failure (it does the world itself wrong, in part 
by making just such a reduced world a self-fulfilling prophecy). There are fertile 
parallels to Kant’s Categorical Imperative here. 
40 Jim Nollman, in Utne Reader, March/April 98, p. 100. There is more to this story, 
though: “When ranching was introduced . . . cattle began to share the watering hole 
without regard to schedules. At first lions kept their distance, as if cattle were an 
extension of the human family. But eventually they attacked. Ranchers reciprocated 
by shooting the lions, and within a few years lions had killed several Bushmen . . .” 
Notice that this is still a communicative form—just a very different and more lethal 
one. 
41 Notice the change of key—a new etiquette. As Bob Jickling puts it, “warnings that 
were once posted and created images of bears as fearsome and dangerous creatures 
have been replaced by the message that, ‘You are entering bear country’—you are the 
intruder, so be careful and respectful.” 
Volume 22, Number 1 87
                                                                                                                     
42 Abram, The Spell of the Sensuous, Chapters 1 and 5.  Remember Shepard’s phrase, 
“the elaboration of covenants . . . with the Other.” As Abram notes, many native 
cultures tell stories of humans becoming animals, and vice versa, creating the 
covenants that later generations (of both) can enter. See also Gary Snyder’s lovely 
essay “The Woman Who Married a Bear,” in The Practice of the Wild, pp. 155–174. 
“Covenant” is a precise word, too. The kinds of mutual obligations and expectations 
that arise from such species-border-crossings are not entirely voluntary, can be 
renewed or broken, but are not constantly created anew (a point emphasized by Jim 
Cheney). 
43 Arne Naess, "Self-realization in Mixed Communities of Humans, Bears, Sheep and 
Wolves", Inquiry 22 (1979): 231-241.  
Bob Jickling and Paul Paquet, “Wolves, Ethics, and Epistemology,” Paper presented 
at “Culling Mammals,” A symposium organized by The Mammal Society and the 
International Fund for Animal Welfare, London, November 24–25, 2000. See also 
Carolyn Merchant, Reinventing Eden, pp. 233–5. 
44 Ian McHarg, Design with Nature (Doubleday, 1969). For examples, see Merchant, 
pp. 236–9. 
45 See my essay “Self-Validating Reduction: Toward a Theory of Environmental 
Devaluation,”  Environmental Ethics 18 (1996): 115-132. Now in the Naess, 
Trumpeter Special Feschrift Issue, Winter 2006. 
46 Christopher Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? (Wm. Kaufmann, 1974). 
47 See The Practice of the Wild, pp. 25–47. “In the old ways, the flora and fauna are 
part of the culture . . . ” (p. 37). 
48 Vine Deloria, Spirit and Reason: The Vine Deloria Reader (Fulcrum Publishing, 
1999), especially pp. 40–60. 
49 See John Seed, Joanna Macy, Pat Fleming and Arne Naess Thinking Like a 
Mountain: Towards a Council of All Beings (New Society Publishers, 1988) and the 
“Workshop Manual” at <www.rainforestinfo.org.au/deep-eco/cabcont.htm>. For 
ecosteries, see the website for the Ecostery Foundation of North America at 
<www.ecostery.org>. 
The Trumpeter 88 
